The Supreme Court issued a divided ruling on whether notice is required for land possessors not listed in revenue records during land acquisition under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act.
The appeal was lodged against a Rajasthan High Court order declaring the land acquisition as void due to the absence of notice being served to the landowner when the acquisition notification was issued.
A division bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Hrishikesh Roy reviewed the matter. Justice Roy rejected the appeal, whereas Justice Misra approved it. Consequently, the case was forwarded to a bigger bench for further consideration.
Justice Misra's perspective held that if the owner's name is absent from land records, the state is not required to conduct a comprehensive investigation. In such instances, serving notice to the owners listed in the land records fulfills the statutory obligation, according to his judgment.
On the other hand, Justice Roy pointed out that the procedure outlined in Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 for issuing notices was not followed in this case. He emphasized that even though land acquisition for a public purpose is allowed, failing to follow the prescribed procedure could harm the interests of landowners and other affected parties. He also stressed the importance of interpreting the statute in a manner that ensures procedural safeguards for those losing their land.
In the case at hand, the respondents initiated legal action against the Urban Improvement Trust (the appellant before the Supreme Court). They sought a permanent injunction to prevent the Trust from acquiring the disputed land without adhering to the proper legal procedures.
When the case was reviewed by the High Court, it determined that the acquisition notification was issued without notifying the plaintiff, rendering it null and void. The High Court also deemed the injunction suit to be legally valid.
The High Court based its decision on Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, emphasizing that for the compulsory acquisition of land, the prescribed procedure outlined in Section 52, which includes giving notice and offering an opportunity for a hearing to the owner and any other concerned parties, must be adhered to.
Justice Hrishikesh Roy, when dismissing the appeal, concurred with the High Court's stance that the procedure outlined in Section 52 of the Act was not observed. He emphasized that Section 52 necessitates the service of notice not only to the owner but also to "any other person interested," thereby encompassing all individuals with an interest in the relevant land.
In finding the land acquisition proceedings to be void ab initio, Justice Roy made the following observation:
"Dispossession without following the prescribed statutory process, such as providing adequate notice, is not only significantly detrimental but also constitutes a violation of constitutional rights, thus rendering the entire land acquisition process void from the outset. It is firmly established that strict adherence to the mandatory procedural stipulations outlined in the legislation is an indispensable prerequisite for compulsory land acquisition. Legally conducted acquisition procedures serve to mitigate the potential for arbitrary actions by the relevant authority."
Justice Roy noted that the respondent had acquired the disputed land and was in undisturbed possession of it until the commencement of land acquisition proceedings. He pointed out that despite the authority's ability to acquire land for a public purpose, failure to adhere to the prescribed procedure could harm the landowners and other affected parties.
"Land acquisition for a public purpose is legally allowed, but the acquiring authority must ensure strict compliance with the statutory framework for compulsory acquisition. Only through rigorous adherence to the established procedure can a degree of protection be provided to landowners and those with an interest, with inherent fairness in the process. Ultimately, this is about safeguarding constitutional rights under Article 300A of the Constitution."
He further emphasized that the statute should be interpreted in a manner that guarantees procedural safeguards for individuals who are losing their land.
"There should be clear boundaries on the power of eminent domain to prevent arbitrary actions. Rigorous adherence to the prescribed procedure is a fundamental safeguard to ensure fairness and transparency in the land acquisition process. These procedures offer landowners and concerned parties a fair chance to voice their objections to the land acquisition and the adequacy of the compensation offered for their land. Denying procedural safeguards to those losing their land would effectively deny them access to justice. In my opinion, such an interpretation should be avoided."
TAGS: eminent domain substantive limits procedural safeguards fairness transparency land acquisition.
